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Abstract 
 
This paper provides empirical evidence of the relation between trade openness, capital 
openness and government expenditures in a cross-sectional time-series context. It is 
shown that capital openness is significantly and negatively related to government 
expenditures in line with the conventional wisdom that capital mobility may undermine 
the ability of governments to maintain larger public sectors. More importantly, the 
compensation hypothesis originally proposed by Rodrik (1998) and traceable back to 
Cameron (1978) is not in general supported by the data. 
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In a pioneering contribution, Cameron (1978) first unveiled the association between the 
openness of the economy and the size of the government for a sample of 18 OECD 
countries. The basic argument is that increasing trade openness may facilitate the 
development of social infrastructures – the density of unionisation, the scope of collective 
bargaining and the strength of labour confederations – and lead to an enlargement of the 
public sector. More recently, and for a greater number of countries, Rodrik (1998) has 
argued that increasing external economy’s exposure (again trade openness) may lead to 
more demand for public expenditures to compensate for increasing external risk, a 
process that has become popular as the compensation hypothesis. 
Recent contributions have challenged this result, suggesting that either the size of 
governments has not changed to mitigate the effects of greater openness (Islam 2004) or 
that causality from trade openness to government size is not supported by data (Molana et 
al. 2004). Garen and Trask (2005) also argue that considering non-budgetary measures of 
government size (like government ownership, price controls, barriers to trade, etc.) less 
open countries tend to have larger public sectors. 
Most of this debate has however focused on one dimension of openness, namely trade 
openness. This is not fully justified on an empirical ground, as capital openness, over 
time, has gained increased quantitative importance in all advanced countries. In the main 
OECD countries included in this paper (see Table A.1 in Appendix for the complete list), 
the weighted share of trade openness on their total GDP was 21.8 per cent in 1975 and 41 
per cent in 2000. The corresponding average figures for foreign direct investments (FDI) 
are 0.9 per cent in 1975 and 10.8 per cent in 2000 – 11 times as much, while those for 
portfolio investments (PI) are 0.7 per cent in 1975 and 12.3 per cent in 2000 – about 16 
times as much. 
At the same time, general government expenditures have climbed, on average, from 
36.8 per cent in 1970 to 50.5 per cent in 1993 and then have fallen to about 44 per cent in 
2000. 
A natural question to ask is therefore whether capital openness may play an 
autonomous role in shaping government size and may affect the validity of the 
compensation hypothesis. By transposing Rodrik’s argument, one could argue that capital 
openness would further increase the risk of external economy’s exposure and, by this 
way, the demand for compensating public expenditures. On the other hand, increasing 
degrees of capital openness may lead to higher mobility of tax factors and leave 
governments with a reduced ability to maintain larger public sectors, a case that is usually 
referred to as the efficiency hypothesis. Following this logic, the potential increasing 
demand for additional expenditures induced by the compensation hypothesis could not be 
easily matched by an increasing supply. The net effect of these two opposite forces is 
therefore a matter for empirical investigation. 
This paper sheds some light on the relative importance of the two hypotheses and on 
the role of both trade and capital openness across countries and over time. First, it is 
shown that capital openness and government size are persistently negatively associated, 
which gives support to the efficiency hypothesis. Second, evidence is provided that the 
compensation hypothesis proposed by Rodrik (1998) and traceable back to Cameron 
(1978) is hardly verified. Third, results are established for both levels and changes of the 
relevant variables. 
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I Reviewing theoretical and empirical studies 
 
The theoretical effects of economic openness on the size of public sectors may be 
summarised by two main positions (Schulze and Ursprung, 1999). On the one hand, the 
compensation hypothesis has recently gained much interest. According to it, larger public 
sectors would be demanded in more open economies to compensate for external risk and 
for the increased level of economic inequality associated to openness. On the other hand, 
an efficiency hypothesis has developed (also known as conventional wisdom), which 
highlights that smaller public sectors would be supplied by national governments when 
economic openness entails an increased mobility of production factors.  
In the same way as in the theory of fiscal federalism local governments may be “too 
small” within national boundaries to apply certain kinds of taxes and to develop certain 
kinds of public expenditures (Oates, 1972), national states may become “too small” in an 
international context to take advantage from the full array of taxes and expenditures. As 
suggested by the literature on tax competition, mobility may cause a downward pressure 
on tax revenues and lead to an ultimate downward pressure on public expenditures. 
The net effect of the opposite forces of the compensation hypothesis and of the 
efficiency hypothesis is therefore rather uncertain from a theoretical point of view and it is 
basically a matter for empirical investigation. 
Now, with regard to the compensation hypothesis, the prevailing literature has 
highlighted that citizens would demand more public expenditures in response to increased 
trade openness (e.g. Ruggie 1982; Garrett 1998b; Rodrik 1998). However, the basic tenet 
of the efficiency hypothesis, is that governments may collect less taxes and can hardly run 
budget deficits in response to an increase of capital openness. The reason is that mobile 
capital may easily disapprove of unpalatable tax policies or lax budget policies by moving 
abroad. This would ultimately lead to a tighter expenditure policy. 
According to some authors, this line of causality is supported by the fact that some of 
the most important welfare reforms have occurred at the same time in which capital 
openness in many countries has increased (Gould 1996; Myøset 1996; Page 1997; Moses 
2000; Swank 2002). 
What does the empirical evidence suggest? In a pioneering paper on the expansion of 
the public economy, Cameron (1978) found a positive association between trade openness 
and the size of the public sector, but no attempt was made to include capital openness in 
the analysis presumably because capital flows, in the most industrialised countries, were 
heavily controlled for. For example, the United States fully liberalised capital markets in 
1974 and they were one of the first countries to go through this process.  
Rodrik (1998) has thoroughly re-established the positive association between trade 
openness and the size of the public sector, justifying it by the need of social insurance 
against additional external risk and extending the empirical evidence to more than a 
hundred countries among developed and developing countries. However, also in this case, 
no attempt has been made to control for capital openness.  
More recently, Sanz and Velázquez (2003) have investigated the effects of the 
openness of the economy, including the averaged stock of inward and outward foreign 
direct investments as a proxy for capital openness. Their main finding is that openness 
would be positively associated to the share of health and social security expenditures in 
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total government expenditures and negatively associated to education, housing, transport 
and communication shares of public expenditures (challenging Rodrik’s findings for sub-
categories of expenditures). Extending the Rodrik’s argument, the authors argue that 
countries with greater amounts of stocks of FDI would experience more risk in total 
employment, as multinationals may change location easier than “national” companies 
(see also Tanzi 2000; White 2003). 
Quinn (1997) also finds evidence that capital liberalisation is associated to larger 
government spending. In the same vein, Bretschger and Hettich (2002) provide evidence 
that both capital openness and trade openness may positively affect the level of social 
welfare expenditures, supporting the compensation hypothesis and extending it to capital 
openness. 
On the other hand, Iversen and Cusack (2000) show that neither trade nor capital 
openness have any effect on government transfers and government consumption. The 
importance of capital openness (variously measured) for social welfare effort, has also 
been recently investigated by Swank (2002), again with no evidence of any relation.2 
Recently, Dreher (2003) has provided for further empirical evidence that globalisation 
does not affect taxes and social policy in OECD countries. In particular, he shows that 
globalisation does not shift the tax burden from mobile capital to immobile labour and 
(relatively) immobile consumption. This follows a series of empirical papers from the 
political science literature where no consensus emerges on the possibility that the 
openness of the economy has reduced either capital or corporate income taxes or both 
(Garrett 1996; Swank 1998; Garrett 1998a, 1998b; Hallerberg and Basinger 1998).  
Rodrik (1997) and Grubert (2001) have instead found a negative relation between the 
openness of the economy and the level of income taxes. Garrett (1999) provides evidence 
that the negative relation between openness and government size can be extended to 
changes of the corresponding variables. Bretschger and Hettich (2002) have also found 
that trade and capital openness are negatively associated to the corporate tax rate and 
positively associated to labour taxes, supporting the theory that the tax burden shifts 
towards less mobile tax bases in open economies. No significant relation with the 
corporate tax rates is instead shown in Swank (2002) and Slemrod (2004). Finally, Garen 
and Trask (2005) show that less open countries may have larger public sectors as 
measured by non-budgetary indicators.  
As it stands, therefore, the empirical literature on the relationship between capital 
openness and government size is not conclusive, as different studies support a positive 
relation, the absence of any relation or a negative relation. In what follows, we add to the 
existing empirical literature, by showing: a) that levels of capital openness are negatively 
associated to government size; b) that levels of trade openness are not positively 
associated to government size; c) that these associations hold both in levels and in 
changes of the corresponding variables. 
To this respect, the present paper does not support the Rodrik’s argument, while it 
finds encouraging support for the efficiency hypothesis. 
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II Hypotheses and empirical strategy 
 
The empirical investigation will focus on the following two maintained hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1 – Capital openness is associated with a smaller government size.  
Hypothesis 2 – Trade openness is not associated with a larger government size.  
 
Hypothesis 1 is a test of the efficiency hypothesis. As previously stated, the basic tenet is 
that higher capital openness would make it harder to tax and to issue public debt to 
finance public expenditures as capital may easily move abroad.  
With capital openness, tax and expenditure policies may indeed stimulate exit to the 
extent that investors do not agree on the nature of public spending, do not agree on the 
present level of tax burden and/or anticipate additional future tax burden to finance 
increasing levels of public spending. As stressed by Garrett (1999), especially financial 
capital “is usually thought to disapprove of all government policies that distort markets, 
and excessive government spending is among the most prominent villains”. 
Hypothesis 2 is a test of the absence of the compensation hypothesis. The basic tenet is 
that if the efficiency hypothesis is verified, the compensation hypothesis would disappear, 
even though this does not necessarily entail a reversed sign of its association with trade. 
More likely, however, the interaction between trade and capital openness is expected to 
be dominated by the efficiency hypothesis. 
According to this hypothesis, the net outcome would be a smaller size of the public 
sector. The extension of the compensation hypothesis to capital openness is thus 
explicitly challenged in this paper. On the contrary, the extension of the efficiency 
hypothesis to the relation between trade openness and government size is thought to be a 
more likely outcome. 
 
 
II.1 The measure of government size 
 
Government size is measured by central government expenditures. Two natural questions 
to ask are: a) why public expenditures should be used as a proper measure of government 
size instead of taxes; b) why central governments expenditures are used instead of general 
government expenditures. 
With regard to the first question, a number of issues can be considered. First, the 
compensation hypothesis is stated in terms of expenditures and not of taxes. Challenging 
this hypothesis would therefore require to play on the same field. 
Second, the nature of the compensation is such that citizens demand more expenditures 
– and not directly more taxes. Even though the compensation hypothesis would suggest 
that it is redistributive expenditures that should increase more, the first element to test is 
whether capital openness has any effect on the level rather than on the composition of 
public spending. As Garrett (1999) has argued, public spending is “perhaps the most 
fundamental indicator of government economic activism”. 
Third, taxes and expenditures move in the same way only when deficit financing is 
ruled out. Deficit-financing, has been an important way to expand public expenditures in 
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many countries over time. With budget deficits, a reduction of public expenditures may 
be associated with a stability of tax revenues. In this case, analysing taxes might be 
misleading. Considering public expenditures allows one to include in a single indicator all 
possible channels through which the efficiency hypothesis may affect the size of public 
sectors.  
Fourth, as argued by Schulze and Ursprung (1999), in open economies governments 
compete by means of both taxes and expenditure policies to attract tax bases. Looking at 
taxes only may again be misleading, as a given level of taxes may be associated with 
composition of public spending that may or may not favour international investors.3 
More crucial is the issue of whether central governments (CG) expenditures represent 
a proper indicator of government size. The answer is not clear-cut. Yet, there are some 
reasons justifying the use of this indicator.  
First, as central government and local government behaviours may significantly differ 
in terms of expenditure policies (especially when local autonomy is strong), it can be of 
interest to isolate the effects of openness on the two government levels (see, for example, 
Verdier and Breen 2001; Garrett and Rodden 2003). The absence of any effect of 
openness on general government expenditures would indeed not imply that openness has 
no effect on government expenditures, as this outcome might conceal opposite forces 
playing at central and local government levels. Therefore, disentangling the effects on CG 
expenditures gives an informative advantage. 
Second, as the validity of the compensation hypothesis, if any, is likely to entail a 
greater redistributive effort of central governments – where most of the redistributive 
function is concentrated – the use of CG expenditures is a natural candidate for this test. 
Nevertheless, it is extremely important to test whether the results are sensitive to the 
definition of government expenditures. Therefore general government (GG) expenditures 
have been used to test the main conclusions of the paper, even though the switch from 
central to general government definitions entails a significant loss of observations. 
Availability of data is therefore also a non-negligible argument to use CG expenditures, 
as one can easily verify from table A.1 in Appendix. 
 
 
II.2 The measure of trade and capital openness 
 
The measure of trade openness used in this paper is rather standard. It is defined as the 
sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. This indicator aims at estimating the 
importance of total trade relative to the size of the domestic product. 
Measurement of capital openness, instead, has been usually fraught with difficulties. 
One of the main issue is what is meant by capital openness. As argued by Montiel (1994: 
311), for example, “capital openness ... is a somewhat amorphous concept, not clearly 
defined in many applications and difficult to measure”. On the other hand, most of the 
empirical literature has converged towards the idea that capital openness indicators 
should indicate either actual or potential capital mobility. 
Some issues should therefore be taken into account. First, should foreign direct 
investments or portfolio investments be considered or both?4 Second, are inflows or 
outflows that best measure of capital openness? Third, are capital flows a more reliable 
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indicator of capital mobility than stocks? Fourth, should flows and stock be disregarded in 
favour of alternative indicators?  
With regard to the first issue, Kant (1996) has shown that measures based on foreign 
direct investments are usually preferred, as they have been found highly correlated with 
capital flights. The distinction made by Singh (2003) in long-term flows (FDI) and short-
term flows (PI) may also help understand that PI may be more speculative, while FDI 
may be thought of as more permanent flows. Claessens et al. (1995) have instead argued 
that this difference is becoming weaker, as what they call a long-term «bricks and 
mortar» investment (a FDI-type) can now be promptly converted into a liquid asset 
through derivatives and hedge funds. 
With regard to the second issue (inflows or outflows), most of the empirical literature 
(see for example Bretschger and Hettich 2002) has focused on the effects of outwards 
FDI on government variables (either taxes or expenditures). This is mainly justified by 
the fact that outflows may have more important consequences on government resources 
than inflows.  
However, from the point of view of measuring capital openness, confining the 
attention to outflows may make some countries appear rather “close” if they attract much 
more capital than what it flows out from the country. In the same vein, using net flows 
(i.e. the difference between inflows and outflows) may be highly misleading, as a given 
net measure may be consistent with any gross flow magnitudes (Kar 1983). In turn, 
different gross flows may cause rather different consequences on the size of the public 
sector. If it is true, a strong preference should be therefore assigned to gross flows, as net 
flows are more likely to underestimate the size and the importance of capital openness 
(Whitman 1969). 
The third issue, flows or stocks, is particularly cogent, as it may give rise to 
significantly different pictures. The empirical literature is rather controversial on this 
issue. For example, Sanz and Velázquez (2003) use stocks; Bretschger and Hettich (2002) 
use flows. One flaw of using flows lies on the fact that zero capital flows is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for financial autarky. Strongly integrated capital markets may 
end up with zero capital flows. 
Montiel (1994), however, argues that countries with higher potential capital integration 
would also experience large actual capital flows, which points to flows as an (on average) 
correct measure for capital mobility. Also, flows best capture mobility, as it is (potential) 
flows that may prevent a given country to change its taxing/expenditure behaviour, not 
the mere presence of a given capital stock outside the country. 
One flaw of using stocks, on the other hand, is how to measure them, i.e. which value 
is to be assigned to investments occurred in past years. The evaluation of stocks is often 
based on historical costs rather than on current market values.5 This may raise more 
serious problems of interpretation of results than in the case of flows. 
With regard to the fourth issue, a debated question is whether capital openness should 
be measured as either actual or potential mobility. Potential mobility could be a more 
satisfactory indicator for capital openness, better reflecting the threat of capital flows. For 
this reason, part of the literature has focused either on qualitative indexes of capital 
market liberalisation6 or on other quantitative measures, as the interest rate differentials 
(in particular covered interest rate differentials calculated with forward foreign-exchange 
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rates), interest arbitrage, real interest parities, etc. (Montiel 1994; Swank 1998). On the 
other hand, all these measures have imperfections.  
Taking into account all these issues, the choice of this paper has fallen on measuring 
capital openness by two distinct measures: the algebraic sum of inward and outward 
foreign direct investments (FDI) on GDP; the algebraic sum of inward and outward 
portfolio investments (PI) on GDP. The first measure will be referred to as FDI openness; 
the second as PI openness. The choice of using gross flows aims at measuring the 
importance of capital flows on the total economy and to give a more proper picture of the 
total mobility of capital across countries. This also limits the risk of polluting the results 
with the possible influence of those factors that may contemporaneously affect 
government expenditures and capital flows.7 
 
 
II.3 Data 
 
The focus of the analysis will be on the main European countries, but the United States, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan will also be included, in particular because 
they experienced a liberalisation of capital flows (US and Canada in 1974, Australia and 
New Zealand in 1984-85 and Japan throughout the ‘80s) before it was introduced in 
Europe in the Nineties (Helleiner 1994). All these countries are developed countries, 
where public expenditures are a significant part of the gross domestic product, formal 
democratic regimes are in place and where redistribution, even though at various degrees, 
is an important issue on the agenda of policy-makers. Developing countries have been 
excluded as, on average, they are countries with relevant cultural, historical and 
institutional differences (Akai and Sakata 2002). 
Data on exports, imports and capital flows (foreign direct investments and portfolio 
investments) are taken from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The same source provides for data on consolidated 
central government expenditures, which are mainly used for the analysis. To get 
reasonably long series on general government expenditures (i.e. including intermediate 
and local government levels), instead, recourse has been made to OECD data. When 
interpreting results, therefore, caution must be used as, in some cases, data from different 
sources are combined. The definition and source of all variables used in this paper are 
reported in table A.2 in Appendix. 
As discussed in Section IV.1, the core of the analysis will be based on the use of 
central government expenditures. Data used cover a reasonable number of years and 
countries – with the exception of Germany, observed only after the re-unification process 
– while the use of general government expenditures generates a non-negligible loss of 
observations. Outliers have been identified and dropped according to the method 
proposed by Hadi (1992) for multivariate analysis. This has led to identifying 1 outlier in 
the measure of trade openness, 15 for FDI openness, 2 for portfolio openness, 1 for 
government deficit and 3 for current account balance. 
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II.4. Econometric issues  
 
The baseline relation between government size and openness is estimated using the 
following equation: 
GSi,t = α + β1TRADEi,t + β2FDI i,t + β3PI i,t + γ pZi,tp
p=1
P
∑ + ei,t   (1) 
 
where GS is government size; TRADE is defined as the sum of exports and imports as a 
share of GDP; FDI is defined as the sum of inward and outward foreign direct 
investments as a percent of GDP; PI is defined as the sum of inward and outward 
portfolio investments as a percent of GDP; Z is a vector of control variables, including in 
most cases real per capita income in US$, a dummy for federal countries, the government 
deficit and the current account balance both in percentage of GDP and a time trend. Other 
control variables have also been included for sensitivity analysis.  
Following Bretschger and Hettich (2002), measures of trade and capital openness are 
corrected for country size.8 They suggest first regressing the measure of openness on an 
indicator of country size and then using residuals from this regression as an unbiased 
measure of openness. By this way, the residuals of the regression describe that part of 
trade and capital openness that is not explained by country size. These residuals can 
therefore be taken as a size-neutral measure of openness. Using this latter measure makes 
Germany and the United States more open than average compared with the traditional 
measure of trade openness. At the same time, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden are defined as less open than average. For all other countries, the size-neutral 
measure gives the same information released by the traditional measure. This correction 
also leaves Australia and Norway with less capital openness than average and Germany 
and the United States with more capital openness than average. 
The analysis of time-series cross sections also entails the treatment of some other 
preliminary issues. With panel data, possible heteroskedasticity across panels should be 
dealt with. Furthermore, the error terms of different panels may be correlated. Both null-
hypotheses of no panel-level heteroskedasticity and no cross-sectional correlation are 
rejected. This would lead to introducing an estimator that could take into account 
heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated panels. Also a test for autocorrelation 
within each panel has been performed via the time-series cross-section equivalent of the 
standard Lagrange multiplier test. The null hypothesis of no autocorrelation cannot be 
rejected only in the case of Austria, Canada, Germany and Greece. Since the coefficients 
of the lagged residuals are also different among countries, estimation has been carried out 
by introducing a country-specific AR(1) process, by which ei,t = ρiei,t−1 +εi,t , where ε has 
the usual assumptions of i.i.d.(0, σ2).  
A test for equality of intercepts across countries is also performed to understand 
whether either fixed or random effects might be a better estimator than OLS on pooled 
data. The null hypothesis of equality of intercept is rejected, which means that OLS on 
pooled data are inconsistent. The choice between fixed or random effects is usually based 
on a Hausman test for the unbiased random effect estimator. Since there are no significant 
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differences in the estimated coefficients between the two methods, a fixed effect estimator 
could be safely implemented.9  
The reason for reporting results from both methods is that fixed effects have a more 
problematic interpretation when the sample used does not represent a closed and 
exhaustive set of units. Countries are selected on the basis of data availability and do not 
exhaust any particular geographical region. On the other hand, the potential importance of 
unobserved effects across countries (e.g. political and societal preferences on the size of 
government) suggests fixed effects as an appropriate estimator. 
It is also worth noting that the fixed effects estimator uses variation within units and 
disregard variation between units. In other words, fixed effects take into account the time 
series component of the data, the reason why results from this method should be 
interpreted as short-run effects. Random effects, instead, use a matrix-weighted average 
of the within and the between estimator and therefore takes into account both long-run 
and short-run effects. A further possibility, which is also used as a sort of sensitivity 
analysis in this paper, is the use of the Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) 
estimator, that carries out a pooled estimation on quasi-demeaned data, i.e. on data 
formed by subtracting only a fraction of the averages. 10 Finally, in order to introduce 
dynamics in the estimated equation, results from the Arellano-Bond estimator will also be 
discussed. 11 
Finally, a test for Granger-causality has been performed according to the methodology 
developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). Given m time periods and i=1,…, N units a test 
for no causality would be a test of the joint hypothesis Ho: δ j = 0
j=1
m
∑  in the model: 
( ) ( ) ( )1,,
1
1,,
1
1,,1,, −
=
−−−
=
−−−−
−+−δ+−β+α=− ∑∑ titi
m
j
jtijtij
m
j
jtijtijtiti uuxxyyyy  
 
where δ s are the coefficients of the first difference of lagged independent variables for m 
time periods.12 Data supports only a causality relation from FDI to government 
expenditures, while this causality is not found in the case of trade and PI openness. 
Furthermore, the absence of causality from government size to FDI is not rejected. 
 
 
III Results 
 
III.1 Time trends 
 
As a preliminary step of the analysis, it is worth considering the evolution over time of 
the main variables. A simple way to perform this task is to regress all variables on a set of 
time (period) dummies. Taking as a base the average of the period 1965-1975, Table 1 
shows that all relevant variables (government size, trade and both capital variables) have 
an upward trend in the period covered by the analysis. Of particular interest is the 
dynamic of government expenditures. In the case of CG expenditures, the time trend is 
particularly marked in the first two decades, but not in the third where the coefficient is 
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statistically significant at 10 per cent. In the case of GG expenditures, time dummies are 
always significant, but the shift in the last decade is the lowest among the three, which 
might imply that government expenditures are growing at a slower rate than before. 
On the other hand, both foreign direct investments and portfolio investments, as a 
share of GDP, show a larger shift in the last decade (between 1995 and 2005, about five 
times and a half the shift calculated for the previous decade in the case of FDI and about 
three times the shift of the previous decade for PI). For trade openness the calculated shift 
is about twice as much the shift of the previous decade. 
Overall, government size is growing at a slower rate, while FDI and PI grow much 
faster than trade openness. Changing the base period does not change the interpretation.  
 
 
III.2. Capital openness and central government expenditures 
 
Table 2 is the core of the analysis. It reports a set of 7 regressions. Columns A to E 
include all available countries (20), while columns F and G focus on the European 
countries (15). Regressions differ by the estimator used. Particularly important are the 
signs of the coefficients of the openness variables. A positive sign of the coefficient of 
trade openness would give support to the validity of the compensation hypothesis. A 
positive sign attached to the coefficients of FDI and PI openness would extend the 
validity of this hypothesis also to the capital openness. A negative sign, instead, would 
support the efficiency hypothesis. 
A set of control variables (government deficit, current account balance, per capita 
income, population, federal government structure and a time trend) is also included in all 
regressions in order to take into account elements of pressure on government 
expenditures. In particular, government deficit would capture the need to contain public 
expenditures with a non-balanced budget. The current account balance seeks to take into 
account that deficits may require, for example, higher interest rates than in a 
counterfactual scenario. This would impair investments at home causing a more stringent 
government budget constraint. Per capita income and population would take into account 
the main economic and demographic pressures on the level of public expenditures; the 
dummy on federal countries would capture the fact that central government expenditures 
may be lower in more decentralised countries; finally a linear time trend would capture 
the natural upward evolution of economic variables, reducing the risk of introducing 
spurious correlation among variables. 
Consider first the regressions with all available countries included (columns A to E). 
The only case in which trade openness has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient (i.e. the compensation hypothesis is supported) is in column A, where OLS on 
pooled data are used. Yet, the coefficients of FDI and portfolio openness are both 
negative, greater in size and statistically significant. However, OLS on pooled data imply 
the equality of intercepts across units, a hypothesis that is – as discussed above – rejected 
by the data. 
It is worth noting that in the context of pooling, the use of the Prais-Winsten panel 
corrected estimator (PCSE) – column B – would leave unaltered the negative sign of FDI 
and portfolio openness, while reversing the sign of the coefficient of trade openness. In 
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other words, the compensation hypothesis disappears. This is even truer when a Feasible 
Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) is used (column C). In this latter case, the coefficient 
of portfolio openness loses its statistical significance. 
As discussed above, the inclusion of different countries and the probability of 
“unobserved effects” suggest to perform both fixed and random effects estimations – 
columns D and E. In both cases, all openness variables are negatively associated to CG 
expenditures, supporting the efficiency hypothesis and not the compensation hypothesis. 
This result is not driven by the presence of extra-European countries, as columns F and G 
(fixed and random effects, respectively – 358 observations on 15 countries) show that 
trade openness and FDI openness are both still negatively associated to government size. 
Portfolio openness has also a statistically significant negative coefficient when fixed 
effects are used, becoming significant only at 10 per cent level when switching to random 
effects.13 
Overall, the econometric analysis of Table 2 provides for a rather clear support to the 
hypothesis that capital openness – especially FDI openness – might be an element of 
downward pressure on the level of government expenditures, therefore supporting the 
efficiency hypothesis and departing from a significant part of the existing literature. At 
the same time, the coefficient of trade openness does not support the compensation 
hypothesis. This casts some doubts on the general validity of the Rodrik’s result when 
capital openness is explicitly introduced into the analysis. 
The previous analysis can be further extended to consider changes – rather than levels 
– of the corresponding variables and to introduce some dependency of government 
expenditures on their own past changes. In other words, equation (1) is now estimated 
using first differences of explanatory variables with some (variable) lag structure on both 
the dependent and the explanatory variables. To achieve this aim, the Arellano-Bond 
(1991) estimator is used. Results are reported in Table 3. 
Consider first column A, where explanatory variables are treated as truly exogenous 
and two lags of the dependent variable are introduced into the equation. Again, the 
coefficient of FDI openness is negative and statistically significant, while portfolio 
openness is not robust to this specification. Furthermore, the coefficient of trade openness 
is again negatively associated to government expenditures, denying support to the 
compensation hypothesis. However, the Sargan test of the null hypothesis of instruments 
validity for this specification is rejected, which might signal either that explanatory 
variables may be better treated as predetermined or endogenous rather than exogenous or 
that the structure of lag is wrong. 
A natural alternative is therefore to treat explanatory variables as predetermined, i.e. as 
variables for which the realization of the error term has some effect on their future 
realisation. This requires instrumenting explanatory variables by levels lagged one or 
more periods. Results are reported in column B. Also in this case, the coefficient of trade 
openness and both coefficients of capital openness are negatively associated to 
government expenditures – again a support for the efficiency hypothesis. Note that, in this 
case, the Sargan test does not reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity and the 
absence of second-order autocorrelation leads to consistent estimators, which is an 
indicator that the explanatory variables are better modelled as predetermined. 
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Switching to a treatment of explanatory variables as endogenous (which requires levels 
lagged 2 or more periods as valid instruments), does not change the main result of the 
analysis (column C). The coefficients of trade openness and capital openness are again 
negatively associated to government expenditures and are therefore robust to this 
alternative treatment. 
Introducing some lag structure (i.e. a lag of first differenced endogenous and 
predetermined variables) does not change the outcome. Columns D and E show that the 
negative sign on the coefficient of FDI openness and trade openness resists the 
introduction of the corresponding lagged (one-period) variables, but portfolio openness 
does not. Column F also shows that the efficiency hypothesis still holds after introducing 
an interaction term between changes in trade and changes in capital openness (trade times 
capital). This term is not statistically significant and does not affect the main conclusions. 
Finally, column G shows that the result is not driven by extra-European countries, as both 
FDI and trade openness have negative and statistically significant coefficients also when 
the analysis is circumscribed to European countries. Finally, using a simple first-
differenced model with FGLS (column H), for all countries and all years, again reveals 
that changes in trade openness and in capital openness are negatively related to central 
government expenditures. 
 
 
III.3 Capital openness and general government expenditures 
 
In order to exploit the maximum availability of data, the previous sections have dealt with 
CG expenditures. In this section, we perform some regressions using data on GG 
expenditures (i.e. including intermediate and local government levels). This is rather 
important to test the robustness of the results to different specifications of government 
size. Results are reported in Table 4 – from column A to F. Fixed effects, random effects 
and the Arellano-Bond estimator have been applied to all available countries and to the 
subset of European countries. The coefficient of FDI openness (or its first difference) is 
negative and statistically significant in all specifications, again supporting the efficiency 
hypothesis. This does not necessarily imply that local government expenditures also bear 
a downward pressure; yet, the effect of capital openness on CG expenditures seems 
enough important to drive GG expenditures down. It is worth noting that the same 
negative association emerges for trade openness, which represents a strong rejection of 
the compensation hypothesis. The coefficient of portfolio openness, on the other hand, 
does not show a clear-cut result. 
The recourse to general government expenditures also allows a more detailed analysis 
of subsets of public spending. In particular, using OECD data, it is possible to test the 
influence of capital openness on the aggregate of social welfare expenditures. This is 
usually considered a more direct test of the compensation hypothesis, as, if any, demand 
for more public expenditures should be directed to the more redistributive items of the 
public budget. 
To this purpose, Table 4 – in columns G to I – reports the results obtained using the 
sum of health, education and social protection expenditures in percentage of GDP as a 
dependent variable. The three basic specifications – fixed effects, random effects and the 
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Arellano-Bond estimator – are again performed with the same explanatory variables. All 
methods once again confirm the negative relation between social expenditures and FDI 
openness, while the compensation hypothesis do not even pass this test on the most 
favourable subset of public spending. 
It is however worth noting that using social welfare expenditures considerably restricts 
the number of observations and countries (121 and 14, respectively) to the most recent 
period. Therefore, indirectly, this also provides a sensitivity test of the general result, 
making them robust to the choice of the definition of public spending, the period and the 
countries included in the analysis. 
Finally, columns J and K use a definition of GG expenditures excluding interest 
expenditures, while columns L and M use a definition of GG expenditures excluding both 
interest and defence expenditures. The former kind of expenditure is excluded as not 
directly controlled for by the public sector; the latter because it answers a different logic 
from the compensation and the efficiency hypothesis. Also in this case, the sign of FDI 
openness is persistently negative, while there is no evidence of the compensation 
hypothesis. 
Overall, the use of general government expenditures does not change the main theme 
of the paper, i.e. a stable support for the efficiency hypothesis and a rejection of the 
compensation hypothesis. 
 
 
III.4. Sensitivity analyses 
 
Table 5 provides for further alternative specifications of the basic regression in order to 
test the robustness of the result. Column A includes squared terms of the openness 
measures. Quite interestingly, the combined effect of the coefficients on trade openness 
gives rise to a sort of curvilinear hypothesis, by which government expenditures increases 
with trade openness up to a certain level of it, after which government expenditure would 
start to decrease. In the case of FDI and portfolio openness, a curvilinear relation is not 
supported, as the coefficients of squared terms are statistically not significant. 
Column B tests the hypothesis that the result could be driven by some countries with a 
particularly high level of government expenditures, i.e. the Nordic European countries 
(Finland, Norway and Sweden). This is not the case, as the coefficient of FDI openness is 
still negative and significant when excluding these countries. On the other hand, trade 
openness has now a positive relation with government expenditures, yet the size of its 
coefficient is much lower than that attached to FDI openness. This means that for a given 
level of trade or FDI openness, the downward pressure on government expenditures 
would be larger than the upward pressure possibly generated by the compensation 
hypothesis. 
Column C reintroduces the time trend and the dummy for federal countries and 
includes political control variables – a dummy variable for centre-left governments in 
power and a dummy variable for proportional electoral systems. Again, the sign of the 
FDI openness is negative and statistically significant. 
Column D introduces a split between inwards and outwards capital flows (for both 
foreign direct investments and portfolio investments). This alternative specification 
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preserves the sign and the meaning of the coefficients of outwards flows but not those of 
inwards flows. Note, however, that in this case there is a high correlation between these 
four capital openness variables, which may give rise to higher standard errors. Also note 
that splitting the measure is actually measuring a different thing from capital openness, as 
discussed in Section II.2. In any case, the efficiency hypothesis is not rejected, while the 
compensation hypothesis is not supported. 
Finally, column E reports the results obtained by including a one-period lagged 
dependent variable and two additional control variables – GDP growth and a dummy for 
the countries that have signed the Maastricht Treaty. Again, there is no evidence of a 
compensation hypothesis, while there is stable support for the efficiency hypothesis. 
The negative association between FDI openness and government size also resists a 
cross-validation in which one country at a time is excluded from the basic econometric 
specification, using a panel corrected standard error estimator (results are not reported in 
table but are available from the author upon request). 
 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, a rather strong support is given to the efficiency hypothesis, according to 
which capital openness is negatively associated to government size. We have shown that 
this result holds for both central and general government expenditures, for various 
definitions of general government expenditures and for different subset of countries and 
periods. The result is also very stable across econometric specifications. As it stands, it 
represents an important point of departure from the empirical literature aimed at 
associating larger governments with both trade and capital openness, at least for the set of 
countries considered here. 
The limited number of countries used in this paper, however, should not be seen as a 
shortcoming. Elaborations on the UNCTAD database show that FDI inflows in OECD 
countries would account for about 78 per cent of world inflows in 1990, 52.6 per cent in 
1997 and 77.8 per cent in 2000, while FDI outflows – in the same years – are 89.7 per 
cent, 78.6 per cent and 87.1 per cent of total world outflows. The system of OECD 
countries is therefore rather close and previous data suggest that if capital openness is to 
play any role in shaping government size it is likely to play it where capital actually 
flows. This might also explain why across-the-world conclusions may be difficult to 
achieve and why, when extending the number of countries, the effects of capital openness 
tend to dilute. 
With regard to the size of the effect of FDI on government expenditures, the estimated 
coefficients imply low elasticities. If one takes into account the highest estimated 
coefficient of FDI and the average of both central and general government expenditures 
by country, the upper limit is represented by Switzerland – with a 0.33 per cent elasticity 
in absolute value in the case of CG and a 0.091 per cent in the case of GG – and the lower 
limit by Italy – with a 0.013 in the case of CG and a 0.008 in the case of GG. All other 
elasticities are in absolute values below 0.1, which means that the effect of FDI, as 
expected, has not been disruptive on the size of the government until now, yet its negative 
sign – beyond being a strong result in itself compared with the existing literature – may 
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signal that if the average level of capital flows increases in the future, government 
expenditures could suffer a larger reduction. Furthermore, since the highest coefficients 
of FDI are estimated in those cases in which only European countries are taken into 
account, it is here that capital flows will be more likely to undermine the size (and 
composition) of public expenditures.  
On the other hand, the compensation hypothesis (associated to trade openness by 
Rodrik 1998) is denied general validity. Trade and capital openness share a negative 
relationship with government expenditures that does not seem to depend on the set of 
control variables included. 
These findings have potentially important consequences from a public policy 
perspective, as they help explain why public policies in these countries might be more 
conservative – capital flows implicitly undermine larger public sectors.  
All these results naturally point in the direction of further investigation of the relations 
between openness and government expenditures along two lines. First, they suggest that 
sub-regional analyses may be more informative than a worldwide analysis in which a 
large set of countries is included that widely differ in both institutional and economic 
settings. This latter methodology, which is widely adopted in the empirical literature, may 
indeed conceal possible different answers of public sectors to openness, something that is 
hardly captured by geographical dummy variables. Second, the use made in this paper of 
central and general government expenditures leaves open the question of how economic 
openness may affect public expenditures at intermediate and local government levels and 
their distribution across government levels, an issue that certainly merits further empirical 
investigation. 
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Table 1 – Time trend of the main variables 
 
CG_exp GG_exp Trade Fdi Portfolio Capital
d75_85 0.055 0.073 0.068 -0.003 0.006 0.002
(***) (***) (**)
d85_95 0.069 0.102 0.062 0.011 0.032 0.044
(***) (***) (**) (**) (***) (***)
d95_05 0.028 0.070 0.136 0.058 0.090 0.148
(*) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Constant 0.257 0.379 0.382 0.017 0.009 0.026
(***) (***) (***) (***) (**)
F-test 11.1 16.0 5.6 70.8 36.9 69.1
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Note: (*) Significant at 10 per cent level; (**) Significant at 5 per cent level; (***) Significant at 1 per cent level. 
Number of observations=520; Number of countries=20.
Variables : CG_exp =Central Government expenditures in % of GDP; GG_exp=General government expenditures in 
% of GDP; Trade =Import+Export in % of GDP; Fdi =FDI inflows + FDI outflows in % of GDP; Portfolio =Portfolio 
outflows+portfolio inflows in % of GDP; Capital =Fdi+Portfolio
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation on IFS data 
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Table 2 – Government size, trade openness and capital openness 
 
A B C D E F G
Coverage All countries, all years
All countries, all 
years
All countries, all 
years
All countries, all 
years
All countries, all 
years
European 
countries, all 
years
European 
countries, all 
years
Method OLS on pooled data PCSE FGLS Fixed Effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects
CG_exp CG_exp CG_exp CG_exp CG_exp CG_exp CG_exp
Trade 0.1099 -0.0334 -0.0072 -0.1095 -0.1062 -0.0720 -0.0563
(***) (*) (**) (***) (***) (***) (**)
FDI -0.4339 -0.2397 -0.2110 -0.3840 -0.3766 -0.6006 -0.6070
(**) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Portfolio -0.2974 -0.0778 -0.0387 -0.1462 -0.1363 -0.1163 -0.1086
(**) (**) (***) (**) (**) (*)
GG Deficit -0.6256 -0.5648 -0.5360 -0.7832 -0.7821 -0.8136 -0.8084
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Current account -0.4488 -0.0968 -0.0453 -0.2506 -0.2369 -0.2862 -0.2979
(***) (**) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Income -0.0000011 -0.0000012 -0.0000011 -0.0000008 -0.0000009 -0.0000008 -0.0000008
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Federal -0.0772 -0.1167
(**) (***)
Time 0.0035 0.0035 0.0033 0.0047 0.0045 0.0050 0.0051
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Population -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0008 0.0029 0.0004
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Constant 0.2644 0.2916 0.2811 0.2616 0.2791 0.1736 0.2498
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Number of observations 501 501 501 501 501 358 358
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20 15 15
F-test 31.2 120.1 121.5
(***) (***) (***)
Ho: fixed effects=0 200.72
(***)
Wald chi2 342.6 559.6 959.8 954.9
(***) (***) (***) (***)
Note: (*) Significant at 10 per cent level; (**) Significant at 5 per cent level; (***) Significant at 1 per cent level.
Variables : CG_exp =Central government expenditures in % of GDP; Trade =Import+Export in % of GDP; FDI =FDI inflows + FDI outflows in % of 
GDP; Portfolio openness =Portfolio outflows+portfolio inflows in % of GDP; GG deficit=General government deficit in % of GDP; Cuurent 
account=Current account balance in % of GDP; Income =Per capita income in US$ at PPP; Federal =Dummy for federal countries; 
Population=Official population
Methods: PCSE=Panel Corrected Standard Errors; FGLS=Feasible Generalised Least Squares
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation on IFS data 
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Table 3 – Government size, trade openness and capital openness (changes) 
 
A B C D E F G H
All countries, all 
years
All countries, all 
years
All countries, all 
years
All countries, all 
years
All countries, all 
years
All countries, all 
years
European 
countries, all 
years
All countries, all 
years
Method Arellano-Bond Arellano-Bond Arellano-Bond Arellano-Bond Arellano-Bond Arellano-Bond Arellano-Bond
First 
differencing, 
FGLS
CG_exp CG_exp CG_exp CG_exp CG_exp CG_exp CG_exp CG_exp
∆CG_expt-1 0.4252 0.5930 0.5024 0.7447 0.7983 0.6144 0.8066
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
∆CG_expt-2 0.0257 0.0505 0.0675 0.0799 0.0488 0.0319 0.0105
(*) (*)
∆tradet -0.0498 -0.0909 -0.0813 -0.0508 -0.0645 -0.0882 -0.0470 -0.0605
(***) (***) (***) (**) (**) (***) (**) (***)
∆tradet-1 0.0291 0.0340
∆FDIt -0.2295 -0.1471 -0.1524 -0.2579 -0.2388 -0.1943 -0.1844 -0.0834
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (**) (**) (***)
∆FDIt-1 0.1052 0.1312
∆Portfoliot -0.0617 -0.0872 -0.1105 -0.0277 -0.0167 -0.1127 -0.0446 -0.0225
(***) (***) (*)
∆Portfoliot-1 -0.0625 -0.0408
∆GG deficitt -0.4909 -0.3374 -0.4042 -0.3200 -0.4601
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
∆Current_accountt -0.1727 -0.1749 -0.1943 -0.1927 -0.0192
(***) (***) (***) (***)
∆Incomet -0.0000007 -0.0000003 -0.0000006 -0.0000003 -0.0000009
(***) (***) (***) (**) (***)
∆Populationt -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.000220 -0.000006
(***) (**) (**)
∆Trade*Capitalt 0.077607
∆GG deficitt-1 0.0254 -0.0018 0.0122
∆Current_Accountt-1 -0.1526 -0.1203 -0.1571
(***) (***) (***)
∆Incomet-1 -0.0000001 0.0000001 -0.0000001
∆Populationt-1 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0019
Constant 0.0007 0.0004 0.0016 0.0006 0.0092
(**) (***) (*)
Number of observations 420 420 420 420 420 420 296 471
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 15 20
Sargan test 152.6 521.2 491.0 466.6 475.1 531.7 334.3
(***)
H0: No autocorrelation of order 1 -6.7 -10.44 -9.57 -12.5 -12.64 -10.76 -10.73
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
H0: No autocorrelation of order 2 -0.84 -0.54 -1.05 0.33 0.75 -0.22 0.63
Wald chi2 942.3 2745.1 2451.1 1605.0 1781.0 2794.1 1209.2 407.6
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Treatment of expalanatory variables Exogenous Predetermined Endogenous Endogenous Predetermined Predetermined Predetermined
Max number of lags to instrument the 
dependent  variable 2 2 2 4 4 2 4
Max number of lags to instrument 
explanatory variables 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Note: (*) Significant at 10 per cent level; (**) Significant at 5 per cent level; (***) Significant at 1 per cent level.
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation on IFS data 
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Table 4 – Openness and general government expenditures 
 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M
All countries, all 
years
All countries, all 
years
European 
countries, all years
European 
countries, all years
All countries, all 
years
European 
countries, all years
All countries, all 
years
All countries, all 
years
All countries, all 
years
All countries, all 
years
All countries, all 
years
All countries, all 
years
All countries, all 
years
Method Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects Arellano-Bond Arellano-Bond Fixed effects Random effects Arellano-Bond Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects
GG_exp GG_exp GG_exp GG_exp GG_exp GG_exp GG_social GG_social GG_social GG_exp_A GG_exp_A GG_exp_B GG_exp_B
∆GG_expt-1 0.7053 0.6590 0.6102
(***) (***) (***)
Trade -0.1360 -0.1122 -0.1355 -0.1152 0.0120 0.0197 -0.1086 -0.0983 0.0226 0.0826
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
∆tradet -0.0877 -0.0758 -0.1024
(***) (**) (***)
Fdi -0.3039 -0.3109 -0.4072 -0.4031 -0.2367 -0.2219 -0.2082 -0.2120 -0.3624 -0.3946
(**) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (**) (***) (***) (***)
∆Fdit -0.1898 -0.2560 -0.1219
(***) (***) (***)
Portfolio -0.0526 -0.0364 -0.0997 -0.0844 0.0556 0.0735 0.0065 0.0144 0.0236 0.0218
(*)
∆Portfoliot -0.0622 -0.0493 0.0477
(*) (*)
GG deficit -0.8316 -0.8301 -0.8162 -0.8036 -0.3082 -0.3053 -0.6956 -0.6945 -0.3943 -0.4229
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
∆GG deficitt -0.2751 -0.3110 -0.0528
(***) (***) (*)
Current account -0.0202 -0.0181 -0.0501 -0.0471 -0.1580 -0.1344 -0.0612 -0.0587 -0.2821 -0.3141
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
∆current_accountt -0.1338 -0.2039 -0.1484
(***) (**) (***)
Income -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000002 -0.000002 -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000004
(***) (***) (***) (***) (**) (**) (**) (**)
∆incomet -0.00000003 -0.00000043 -0.00000052
Time trend 0.0046 0.0045 0.0057 0.0056 0.0046 0.0041 0.0033 0.0032 0.0029 0.0033
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Federal -0.0327 -0.0248 0.0627 -0.0224 0.0315
Population -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0007
(**) (***) (***) (**) (***) (***)
∆populationt -0.000037 -0.0212 0.0003
(***) (*)
Constant 0.4005 0.4117 0.4023 0.4153 0.0014 0.0031 0.2760 0.2402 0.0006 0.3717 0.3779 0.3609 0.3644
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Number of observations 351 351 235 235 299 196 121 121 86 343 343 121 121
Number of countries 19 19 14 14 19 14 14 14 12 19 19 14 14
F-test / Wald chi2 50.9 409.8 49.2 331.9 1666.3 1098.4 23.5 188.9 351.9 52.5 422.5 13.4 113.5
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Ho: fixed effects=0 71.8 70.8 86.4 128.5 45.2
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Treatment of expalanatory 
variables Predetermined Predetermined Predetermined
Sargan test 366.4 226.3 122.0
Autocorrelation of order 1 -6.2 -5.02 -2.39
(***) (***) (**)
Autocorrelation of order 2 0.05 0.17 0.30
Note: (*) Significant at 10 per cent level; (**) Significant at 5 per cent level; (***) Significant at 1 per cent level.
Variables: See Table 2. ∆ indicates first differencing; t-1 indicates one-period lag.
Not previously defined variables: GG_Social=(Health expenditures + Education expenditures + Social protection expenditures)/GDP; 
GG_exp_A=General government expenditures excluding interest expenditures on GDP; GG_exp_B=General government expenditures excluding interest 
and defence expenditures on GDP.
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation on OECD data 
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Table 5 – Alternative specifications 
 
 
A B C D E
All countries, 
all years
Excluding Nordic 
countries, all years
All countries, 
all years
All countries, 
all years
All countries, 
all years
Method FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS
CG_exp CG_exp CG_exp CG_exp CG_exp
CG_expt-1 0.9532
(***)
Trade 0.0551 0.0390 -0.0799 -0.0064 0.0026
(***) (**) (***)
Trade2 -0.1545
(***)
Fdi -0.1855 -0.1458 -0.3170 -0.1149
(***) (***) (***) (***)
Fdi2 0.0006
Portfolio -0.0018 -0.0337 -0.0163 -0.0290
Portfolio2 -0.2968
GG Deficit -0.5438 -0.5580 -0.5346 -0.1060
(***) (***) (***) (***)
Current account 0.0238 -0.0272 -0.0444
Income -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000002 -0.000001 -0.000001
(***) (***) (***) (***)
Left -0.0009
Proportional -0.0448
(***)
Time trend 0.0030 0.0033
(***) (***)
Federal -0.1993
(***)
Population -0.0005 -0.00001
(***) (***)
Maastricht 0.0077
(**)
Growth -0.0142
(***)
FDI outflows -0.2772
(***)
FDI inflows -0.1149
PI outflows -0.1165
(**)
PI inflows 0.0259
Constant 0.2770 0.2934 0.3958 0.2806 0.0124
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Number of observations 501 421 397 501 471
Number of countries 20 17 16 20 20
F-test / Wald chi2 369.6 340.5 654.6 548.3 15334.5
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Note: (*) Significant at 10 per cent level; (**) Significant at 5 per cent level; (***) Significant at 1 
per cent level.
Variables not previously defined: Left=Dummy for centre-left governments; Proportional=Dummy 
for proportional electoral systems; Maastricht=Dummy for Maastricht Treaty; Growth=Rate of 
growth of GDP. X2 indicates the squared value of the variable
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation on IFS data 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1 – Coverage for government expenditures 
 
 
Country Initial year Final year Missing years Number of 
observations Initial year Final year Missing years
Number of 
observations
Australia 1970 2002 33 1970 2002 33
Austria 1967 1996 30 1976 1996 21
Canada 1970 2001 2000 31 1970 2001 2000 31
Denmark 1975 1998 1979; 1980 22 1975 1998 1979; 1980 22
Finland 1975 1997 23 1975 1997 23
France 1975 1997 23 1995 1997 3
Germany 1991 1998 8 1991 1998 8
Greece 1976 1999 1994; 1998 22 1988 1999 1994; 1998 10
Ireland 1974 1997 24 1985 1997 13
Italy 1970 1998 29 1980 1998 19
Japan 1977 1993 17 1990 1993 4
Netherlands 1970 1997 1996 27 1970 1997 1989 28
New Zealand 1972 2000 1989 28 1986 2000 1989 14
Norway 1975 2003 2000; 2001 27 1978 1999 22
Portugal 1975 1998 1981 23 1977 1998 1981; 1982 20
Spain 1975 1998 24
Sweden 1970 2003 1998-2001 30 1993 2003 1998-2001 7
Switzerland 1983 2003 1999-2001 18 1990 2002 1999; 2000 11
United Kingdom 1970 1997 28 1970 1997 28
United States 1970 2003 34 1970 2003 34
Total 501 351
Central government expenditures General government expenditures
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Table A.2 – Definition of variables 
 
 
Variables (*) Description Source
CG_exp Central government expenditures  on GDP IFS (**)
GG_exp
General government expenditures on GDP (also used excluding 
interests - GG_exp_A - and interests and defence expenditures - 
GG_exp_B)
OECD and elaborations on OECD data
GG_Social Health, education and social protection expenditures on GDP Elaborations on OECD data
Trade Imports + Exports on GDP Elaborations on IFS data
FDI Foreign direct investment inflows + Foreign direct investment 
outflows on GDP Elaborations on IFS data
Portfolio Portfolio investment inflows + Portfolio investment outflows on GDP Elaborations on IFS data
Capital FDI + Portfolio Elaborations on IFS data
Trade x Capital Interaction between trade and capital Elaborations on IFS data
GG_Deficit General government budget balance IFS
Current account Current account balance IFS
Income Income per capita in US$ Elaborations on IFS data
Growth Rate of growth of GDP Elaborations on IFS data
Population Total official population IFS
Time Time trend Author's elaborations
Left Dummy variable for centre-left governments Author's elaborations on official data
Proportional Dummy variable for proportional electoral systems Author's elaborations on official data
Maastricht Dummy variable for Maastricht treaty Author's elaborations
FDI inflows FDI inflows on GDP Elaborations on IFS data
FDI outflows FDI outflows on GDP Elaborations on IFS data
PI inflows PI inflows on GDP Elaborations on IFS data
PI outflows PI outflows on GDP Elaborations on IFS data
Federal Dummy for federal countries Author's elaborations
(*) Many variables are used in first difference (indicated by ∆) and lagged (indicated by t-1)
(**) Data for Netherlands and the Unted States are from OECD
Note: IFS=International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund; OECD=Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development
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2
 One reason might be that the dataset used in Swank (2002) extends only until 1993. At that time, capital openness was 
not yet playing a very prominent role in affecting national economies. It is worth recalling that in many European 
countries, capital flows were controlled for until the beginning of the Nineties. The trend for liberalisation in Europe 
began when Britain abolished its system of capital controls in 1979. The Delors Commission began in 1986 to 
formulate a plan for a series of directives aimed at liberalising capital movements among European countries 
unconditionally. The final directive on capital movements was issued in June 1988. An interesting historical perspective 
on this process is Abdelal (2006). For a detailed description of this process, see Helleiner (1994), especially chapter 7. 
3
 This preference for public expenditures, however, does not entail that the analysis of taxes can be fully disregarded. 
As recently shown by Aizenman and Jinjarak (2006), globalization may have significant effects on tax bases of 
variously “hard to collect” and “easy to collect” taxes, as well as consequences on the total tax/GDP ratio. 
4
 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines foreign direct investments (FDI) as those giving the investor an 
effective voice in management, while portfolio investments (PI) would give no significant influence over the operations 
of enterprises. In particular, a direct investor is an enteprise who owns 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or 
voting power of another enterprise residing in another country. Also chains of ownership are possible, as direct 
investments may include entities that are subsidiaries, associates and branches. A portfolio investments, instead, is 
characterised by equity securities, debt securities in the form of bonds and notes, other money market instruments and 
financial derivatives. In subsidiaries a non-resident owns more than 50 per cent; in associates, a non-resident owns less 
than 50 per cent. 
5
 This is the reason why, in economic series of flows and stock, by starting from any given stock in any given year, 
adding flows for a certain number of years do not give the amount of stock in the final year. 
6
 The most common is a dummy variable for capital account openness on the basis of the International Monetary Fund 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREARS). 
7
 For example, if a lower growth raises expenditures for social benefits and depresses FDI inflows at the same time, it 
should also increase FDI outflows. A higher growth should instead increase FDI inflows and reduce FDI outflows and 
public expenditures for social benefits. In both cases, the algebraic sum of FDI inflows and outflows may signal a 
relevant capital mobility, limiting the relevance of growth as a driving factor in explaining the relation between capital 
flows and government size. 
8
 Incidentally, this receives the suggestion by Alesina and Waczriag (1998) by which the observed correlation between 
openness and size may be due to the exclusion of a country size variable in regressions relating government size and 
trade openness. See also Frankel and Romer (1999). 
9
 Results of tests are not reported in tables. They are available from the author upon request. 
10
 FGLS is usually thought to be more efficient than alternative panel estimators. However, Beck and Katz (1995) have 
shown that, when using 10 to 20 panels and 10 to 40 time periods per panel (which is basically the case of the present 
analysis), Prais-Winsten estimates perform more satisfactorily, as the full FGLS variance-covariance estimates are anti-
conservative (standard errors are usually higher and statistical significance ‘optimistic’). 
11
 The Arellano-Bond estimator is a GMM estimator using a first difference of the basic econometric specification 
including lags of the dependent variable on the right hand side and lags of independent variables as instruments for their 
first differences. See Arellano-Bond (1991). 
12
 Note that this test differs from those proposed by Molana et al. (2004) and Islam (2004), in which the relationship 
among variables is tested country by country. Instead, the logic of this test resembles that developed by Im et al. (1997), 
where cointegration between variables is tested at a panel, rather than at an individual, level. In particular, tests are 
carried out at individual level, but what matters is the average value of the test not its individual values. 
13
 Incidentally, it is worth noting the persistently negative sign of per capita income, which may seem to be 
counterintuitive, especially if one thinks to a mechanism like the Wagner’s law. In the logic of Wildavsky (1975), 
however, the negative sign of income may suggest a counter-Wagner law, by which the size of the public sector in 
relatively high-income countries (which is the case of our sample) may be inversely related to economic growth. 
